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[T]he IRS relies on intimidation tactics and arm twisting to
strike fear in the hearts of those it bullies. . . . And they
do this in the name of compliance.'
I.

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

This article is about taxpayer privacy and Internal Revenue
Service (Service) extortion tactics. Each topic alone is important. Together they decree a compelling need for change.
Taxpayer information2 is confidential and, with limited exceptions,
is statutorily nondisclosable by the government. 4 Some courts, however, have interpreted the exceptions so broadly that they have become the general rule. The interpretation of the judicial and administrative proceeding exception of section 6103 is an example. 5 As a
result, taxpayers have lost privacy, and the government has gained
a mighty weapon with which to bully taxpayers. Some might call the
permission to disclose information extortion.6

1. Taxpayers' Bill of Rights: Hearings on S. 579 and S. 604 Before the Subcomm. oni
Private Retirement Plans and Oversight of the Internal Revenne Service of the Senate Comm.
on Finance, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 19 (1987) [hereinafter Taxpayers' Bill of Rights
Hearings] (statement of Sen. Pryor). Senator Pryor further stated, "We must keep in mind the
dangers of giving any agency the unchecked force that can literally destroy citizens in this

country. These are individual taxpayers ....
They have rights that must be protected." Id.
2. The definition of "return information" is very broad and encompasses many things other
than the actual data on the return itself. See I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2) (1991) (unless otherwise stated,
all references to the Internal Revenue Code will be to the 1986 Code, as amended and in effect
for 1991); infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
3. I.R.C. § 6103(a).
4. I.R.C. § 6103(a). Section 6103(a) provides:
Returns and return information shall be confidential, and except as authorized by
this title(1) no officer or employee of the United States,
(2) no officer or employee of any State, any local child support enforcement
agency, or any local agency administering a program listed in subsection (l)(7)(D)
who has or had access to returns or return information under this section, and
(3) no other person (or officer or employee thereof) who has or had access to
returns or return information under subsection (e)(1)(D)(iii), (1)(12), paragraph (2)
or (4)(B) of subsection (in). or subsection (n), shall disclose any return or return
information obtained by him in any manner in connection with his service as such
an officer or an employee or otherwise or under the provisions of this section. For
purposes of this subsection, the term "officer or employee" includes a former officer
or employee.
Id.
5.
6.

See I.R.C. § 6103(h)(4).
Cf. Johnson v. Sawyer, 760 F. Supp. 1216, 1233 (S.D. Tex. 1991) (recounting taxpayer's

testimony which indicated that a Service agent threatened the use of news releases in order to
secure the taxpayer's cooperation).
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The purpose of this article is to both expose the problem of the
court's broad interpretation of section 6103 and to suggest solutions.
Part II discusses the history of governmental abuses of taxpayer privacy and illustrates why the government, which possesses a huge
arsenal of weapons against taxpayer privacy, needs restraint. While
the playing field between taxpayers and the Service will never be
level, these suggestions will fulfill the congressional mandate of section
6103.
Part III first discusses the 1976 amendments which forced many
restraints on government disclosure of taxpayer information. Second,

part III critically analyzes several court decisions which effectively
removed one such restraint. 7 Unfortunately, this restraint provided
the greatest protection to taxpayer privacy. Third, part III analyzes
the three court decisions which interpret the statute and fulfill the
congressional mandate." Finally, part III discusses a third interpretation of the judicial proceeding exception. This third interpretation

implicitly removes taxpayer protection from government protection. 9
Part IV recommends several alternative statutory amendments in
descending order of attractiveness. In addition, part IV recommends
that taxpayers more widely utilize an existing remedy against govern-

ment disclosure offered by protective orders.
II.

BACKGROUND

During the Watergate era, the use of "tax hit lists" by the government became apparent, as did the need for more privacy protection
for taxpayers.10 The Privacy Act of 197411 partially addressed this
7. See Lampert v. United States, 854 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1034
(1989); Peinado v. United States, 669 F. Supp. 953 (N.D. Cal. 1987), affd sub nom., Lampert
v. United States, 854 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1034 (1989); Figur v.
United States, 662 F. Supp. 515 (N.D. Cal. 1987), affd sub nom., Lampert v. United States,
854 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1034 (1989); infra.text accompanying notes
52-79.
8. Rodgers v. Hyatt, 697 F.2d 899 (10th Cir. 1983); Chandler v. United States, 687 F.
Supp. 1515 (D. Utah 1988), affd, 887 F.2d 1397 (10th Cir. 1989); Johnson v. Sawyer, 640 F.
Supp. 1126 (S.D. Tex. 1986); see infra text accompanying notes 81-133.
9. See Thomas v. United States, 890 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1989); infratext accompanying notes
134-42.
10. S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 318 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3439, 3746-47 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]; STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON
TAXATION, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM
ACT OF 1976, at 314-15 (1976), reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. 326-27 [hereinafter JOINT COMMITTEE
REPORT].

11. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a (1988)).
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need. Although the Act encompassed privacy in tax returns generally, 12 the legislative history shows that Congress recognized the need
for more specific legislation. 13 For example, Congress established the
Privacy Protection Study Commission and directed the Commission
to report information disclosure by the Service to other federal agencies. 14 In 1976, Congress adopted many of the Commission's recommendations, including the fundamental concept that tax returns should be
kept confidential by the Service.'5 Congress's actions implicitly recognized the need for taxpayer privacy.
Prior to 1976, tax returns were "public records" and were open to
inspection by government agencies under section 6103.16 Many returns
were even open to public examination under the regulations.' The
Tax Reform Act of 1976 changed the statute completely. It generally
required that tax returns be kept confidential, but allowed limited
disclosure.18 This complete reversal is stated clearly in the legislative
history of the Act. In the Joint Committee on Taxation's language,
"[a]lthough prior law describes income tax returns as 'public records'
...Congress felt that returns and return information should generally
be treated as confidential and not subject to disclosure except in those
limited situations delineated in newly amended section 6103 where it
was determined that disclosure was warranted."' 19
Thus, section 6103 was overhauled completely and took on a whole
new purpose of confidentiality and restricted access. This much is
clear and free from debate. However, it is far from clear whether the
statute actually affords taxpayers real protection. The statute does
state that returns shall be confidential, 20 but describes almost exclu21
sively disclosure exceptions.

12. Id. § 5(a). James N. Benedict & Leslie A. Lupert, Federal Income Tax Returns The Tension Between Government Access and Confidentiality, 64 CORNELL L. REv. 940, 949
(1979).
13. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 5(a), 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as amended at
5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988)).
14. Benedict & Lupert, supra note 12, at 949-50.
15. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1202, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of I.R.C.); see Benedict & Lupert, supra note 12, at 950; see also Francis
E. Cullen, Note, Personal Privacy Versus Public Interests: Government Publicationof Tax
Information Disclosed in a Judicial Proceeding, 6 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 115, 115-16 (1989).
16. See I.R.C. § 6103 (1954) (current version at I.R.C. § 6103.
17. I.R.C. § 6103(a) (1954) (current version at I.R.C. § 6103(a)).
18. I.R.C. § 6103.
19. JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 10, at 327.
20. I.R.C. § 6103(a).
21. See I.R.C. § 6103(c)-(o).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol43/iss5/5

4

Little: Extra-Judicial Discussion of Taxpayer Information: The IRS Bully
TAX INFORMATION

While the statute discusses both confidentiality and disclosure, the
legislative history indicates that the overriding concern of Congress
was confidentiality.2 Congress focused on the potential abuses of taxpayers arising from others using their tax return information for nontax purposes.23 In particular, Congress feared that the disclosure of
return information to other federal and state agencies breached taxpayers' reasonable expectation of privacy." Congress clearly recognized the need for taxpayers to believe they were being treated fairly
and that their returns were being kept confidential.m Further, Congress realized the public's reaction to the lack of privacy could "seriously impair the effectiveness of our country's very successful voluntary assessment system which is the mainstay of the Federal tax
system. "26
In overhauling section 6103, Congress's goal was to balance the
government's need for information with the taxpayer's right to privacy
while maintaining continued compliance with the federal tax system.2
The overriding purpose of the provisions of section 6103 was to protect
tax returns and return information from misuse by federal and state
agencies.2 Therefore, the issue to be resolved is whether confidentiality and disclosure should be construed as complementary or as separate
and independent protections under the statute.
III.

THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE LAw

A. PreliminaryMatters
Section 6103 acts as a general prohibition against the disclosure of
return information.2 However, the statute does contain several exceptions to the general rule of nondisclosure.30 The focus of this article
is on the judicial or administrative tax proceeding exception of section

22. SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 3439, 3746-47.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 3747.
25. Id. A congressional committee specifically mentioned that the Privacy Act of 1974 had
some impact on the disclosure of tax information, but that it did not place specific emphasis on
the unique aspects of tax returns and tax return information. Id.
26. Id.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 3439, 3746-47.
29. Wiemerslage v. United States, 838 F.2d 899, 902 (7th Cir. 1988). Cf. Stokwitz v. United
States, 831 F.2d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that § 6103 "applies only to information filed
with and disclosed by the IRS"), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1033 (1988).
30. See I.R.C. § 6103(c)-(o).
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6103(h)(4) and the issues arising in enforcement. Section 6103(h)(4)
provides in part:
Disclosure in Judicial and Administrative Proceedings - A
return or return information may be disclosed in a Federal
or State judicial or administrative proceeding pertaining to
tax administration, but only(A) [if] the taxpayer is a party to the proceeding, or the
proceeding arose out of, or in connection with, determining
the taxpayer's civil or criminal liability, or the collection of
such civil liability, in respect of any tax imposed under this
title;
(B) if the treatment of an item reflected on such return
is directly related to the resolution of an issue in the proceeding;
(C) if such return or return information directly relates
to a transaction relationship between a person who is a party
to the proceeding and the taxpayer which directly affects
the resolution of an issue in the proceeding; or
(D) to the extent required by order of a court pursuant
to section 3500 of title 18, United States Code, or rule 16
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, such court being
authorized in the issuance of such order to give due consideration to congressional policy favoring the confidentiality of
returns and return information as set forth in this title.
However, such return or return information shall not be
disclosed as provided in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) if the
Secretary determines that such disclosure would identify a
confidential informant or seriously impair a civil or criminal
tax investigation.1
Thus, section 6103 authorizes disclosure of return information.
The provisions of section 6103 are violated when the Service makes
an unauthorized disclosure of return information.- Violators of section
6103 are subject to both criminal- and civil35 sanctions. "Return infor-

31. I.R.C. § 6103(h)(4).
32. Id.
33. All disclosures of return information are unauthorized unless they fall within the narrow
exceptions of § 6103. See I.R.C. § 6103(a).
34. See I.R.C. § 7213. Willful disclosures in violation of § 6103 are felonies punishable by
a fine of up to $5000 or imprisonment of up to five years, or both. I.R.C. § 7213(a).
35. See I.R.C. § 7431. This section authorizes a minimum damage award of $1000 against
the government for each unauthorized disclosure, as well as punitive damages in the case of
willful or grossly negligent disclosure. I.R.C. § 7431(c).
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mation" is defined very expansively.3 6 It encompasses much more than
the actual entries on tax returns. Most significantly, return information
includes the fact that the taxpayer is being investigated by the govern37
ment.
Disclosure of return information in press releases may fall within
the exception for disclosure in judicial or administrative proceedings,3
depending on the definition of administrative tax proceeding. The statute defines tax administration very broadly.39 The definition includes:
"the administration, management, conduct, direction, and supervision
of the execution and application of the internal revenue laws. . ..

.40

Tax administration also encompasses "assessment, collection, enforcement, litigation, publication, and statistical gathering functions under
such laws .. ."" Therefore, press releases could be defined as publications and fall within the definition of tax administration. 42 Yet, although the statute contains over twenty pages of disclosure exceptions,
there is only one specific media exception. 3 That exception authorizes
the release of taxpayer identification information which notifies persons entitled to refunds that the Service has been unable to locate
them.44 Therefore, this media exception merely permits disclosure as
publication of notice to taxpayers entitled to refunds.
In applying section 6103, the underlying question is whether the
United States really has a voluntary assessment system. For the vast
majority of taxpayers the answer is no.45 There are severe penalties
36.

I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2). Section 6103(b)(2) provides in part:

The term "return information" meansa taxpayer's identity, the nature, source, or amount of his income....
tax liability, tax withheld, deficiencies, overassessments, or tax payments, whether
the taxpayer's return was, is being, or will be examined or subject to other inves-

tigation or processing, or any other data, received by, recorded by, prepared by,
furnished to, or collected by the Secretary with respect to a return or with respect
to a determination of the existence, or possible existence, of liability (or the amount

thereof) of any person under this title for any tax, penalty, interest, fine, forfeiture,
or other imposition, or offense ....
I.R.C.
37.
38.
39.

40.

§ 6103(b)(2)(A).
I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2)(A).
I.R.C. § 6103(h)(4).
I.R.C. § 6103(b)(4).

I.R.C. § 6103(b)(4)(A)(i).

41. I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2)(B).
42. See I.R.C. § 6103(b)(4)(B). Even more broadly, press releases may be characterized as
an aspect of increased taxpayer compliance, and thus as enforcement of the tax laws. See id.
43. I.R.C. § 6103(m)(1).
44. Id.

45. For the vast majority of taxpayers subject to withholding and informational reporting
requirements, the system is clearly one of forced compliance.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1991

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 5 [1991], Art. 5
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

for failure to file tax returns. 46 In addition, the Supreme Court long
ago established that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination will not excuse the filing of returns. 47 The Supreme Court
is also of the view that the information that must be shown on a tax
return is not compelled disclosure.48 As a result, there is a need for
statutory protection of sensitive information taxpayers are required
to reveal in their tax returns.
B.

Judicial Interpretationof Section 6103

Two distinct lines of reasoning are used in interpreting the scope
of the disclosure in tax proceedings. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals focuses on the confidentiality of the information covered under
section 6103. 49 By doing so, the court holds that any return information
properly placed on the public record loses its confidentiality and
thereby loses the protection of section 6103.- The Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals takes the opposite approach. In its view, section 6103
concerns disclosures of return information, and it is irrelevant that it
loses its confidentiality when it becomes a part of the public record.51
1. The Lost Confidentiality Cases (Lampert/Peinado/Figur)5
Three cases decided by the Northern District of California and
consolidated for appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, decide
the issue of whether the government violates section 6103 when it
issues press releases containing taxpayer return information. In

46. See I.R.C. §§ 6651, 6652 (providing monetary penalties for failure to file tax return
and informational returns); see also I.R.C. § 7203 (imposing a fine of up to $25,000 and imprisonment for up to one year for willful failure to file returns).
47. Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 650 (1976); United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S.
259, 263-64 (1927).
48. Garner, 424 U.S. at 659-61.
49. Lampert v. United States, 854 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1034
(1989).
50. Id.; see Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) (clarifying that
open court proceedings become a part of the public record); see also Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S.
367, 374 (1947) (establishing that trials are public events and that whatever takes place in the
courtroom is the public's property). Thus, matters transpiring in court become a part of the
public record and, absent a protective order, they lose any confidentiality they might otherwise
have had.
51. E.g., Rodgers v. Hyatt, 697 F.2d 899 (10th Cir. 1983); Chandler v. United States, 687
F. Supp. 1515 (D. Utah 1988), affd, 887 F.2d 1397 (10th Cir. 1989).
52. Lampert v. United States, 854 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1034
(1989).
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Peinado v. United States,- the government issued two press releases:
one announcing that Peinado plead guilty to two counts of tax evasion,
and a second announcing his sentence.-4 The district court held section
6103 was not violated because the press releases merely restated indictment allegations or open court proceedings.5
The court stated that it was not Congress's intent that section
6103 penalize the government for "repeating information that is already
a matter of public record." Moreover, the court found that a press
release that "simply announces or broadcasts what is already known
from court proceedings is not a disclosure" within the meaning of
section 6103.r7
In Figurv. United States,- the taxpayer claimed that section 6103
was violated when the United States Attorney's Office issued a press
release summarizing various counts in the criminal information filed
against the taxpayer. 59 The parties agreed that under section 6103(h)(4)
the government may disclose return information in a criminal information, which is a matter of public record.2 They also agreed that the
press release contained return information.1 The issue was whether
the press release was an illegal disclosure of return information under
section 6103.62
Like Peinado, the Figur court held that issuance of a press release
announcing information contained in the public record does not violate
section 6103.6 In so holding, the court focused on the taxpayer's loss
of a reasonable expectation of privacy once a return becomes a part
of the public record.64 The Figur court stated that once return information is in the public record, section 6103 protection becomes moot.

53. 669 F. Supp. 953 (N.D. Cal. 1987), affd sub nom., Lampert v. United States, 854 F.2d
335 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1034 (1989).
54. Id. at 954.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 662 F. Supp. 515 (N.D. Cal. 1987), affd sub nom., Lampert v. United States, 854 F.2d
335 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1034 (1989).
59. Id. at 516.
60. Id. at 517.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. The Figur court rejected the opposite result reached in Rodgers v. Hyatt by the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals because the Rodgers court ignored the loss of § 6103's protection
for information in the public record. 697 F.2d 899 (10th Cir. 1983). See infra text accompanying
notes 81-92.
64. Figur, 662 F. Supp. at 517.
65. Id.
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Further, the Figur court found that the government could not "disclose" or "make known" return information in the public record, because the act of disclosure "presupposes confidentiality or at least
limited access to the material revealed."- Because there was no confidentiality in the court proceedings, there could be no disclosure.
Lampert v. United States,67 Figur and Peinado were consolidated
for appeal. Lampert was not a criminal case, but a civil action to
enjoin the taxpayers from promoting abusive tax shelters.- The United
States Attorney's Office and the Service each issued separate press
releases concerning the filing of the injunction and the investigation
of the taxpayers.6 9 The district court held that the press release concerning Lampert was a violation of section 6103, but the government
could avoid civil damages because the disclosure was made in good
faith. 70 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that "once
return information is lawfully disclosed in a judicial forum, its sub7
sequent disclosure by press release does not violate" section 6103. '
The Lampert court relied heavily on the earlier decisions of United
States v. Posner7 2 and Cooper v. I.R.S.73 to reason that, once return

66. Id. The statute does not seem to take such a restricted definition of disclosure. The
statute itself defines "disclosure" as "the making known to any person in any manner whatever
a return or return information." I.R.C. § 6103(b)(8) (emphasis added). Interestingly, the court
stated its belief that Congress was aware of this potential disclosure in judicial proceedings.
Figur, 662 F. Supp. at 517 n.1. Because the requirement of safeguarding confidentiality in §
6103(p) does not apply to return information disclosed in a judicial proceeding, the Figurcourt
concluded that Congress must have implicitly allowed for § 6103 not to apply to matters of
public record. Id. at 518.
67. 854 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1988), ceil. denied, 490 U.S. 1034 (1989).
68. Id. at 336; see I.R.C. § 7408(a) (providing for a "civil action in the name of the United
States to enjoin any person" from promoting abusive tax shelters). Lampert certainly presents
a different scenario for the issuance of a press release than the criminal convictions and sentences
of Fignrand Peinado. If the aim of publicly announcing taxpayer cases in litigation is to further
voluntary compliance, one must question the issuance of press releases in civil cases. See in(fra
text accompanying notes 182-98 (discussing aspects of taxpayer compliance).
69. Lam pert, 854 F.2d at 336.
70. Id. (citing I.R.C. § 7431(b)).
71. Id. at 338. The government argued in the alternative that if there was a violation of
§ 6103, it was relieved of liability by the good faith, but erroneous exception of § 7431(b). Id.
at 336. Because the court held that § 6103 was not in fact violated, it did not decide the good
faith exception issue under § 7431(b). Id.
72. 594 F. Supp. 930 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
73. 450 F. Supp. 752 (D.D.C. 1977). Interestingly, in footnote 4 of the Cooper opinion, the
court discussed the publication of confidential documents and stated:
It is, of course, somewhat anomalous to refer to all of the documents in question
as confidential. Many are not truly confidential in any respect. For example, some
of the documents are deeds and are thus doubtless recorded in some county or
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information is placed in the public record, confidentiality and any expectation of privacy no longer apply. 74 Therefore, if a taxpayer's return
information is lawfully disclosed in a judicial proceeding, the information is no longer confidential. 7- The information then may be disclosed
without regard to section 6103.76
The taxpayer in Lampert agreed that anyone could obtain the
disclosed information from the public record, but insisted the government must rely on a specific statutory exception to disclose information
further.7 The court dismissed the taxpayer's position as too technical
and stated that only a strict, literal reading of section 6103 would
support the taxpayer's position. 7 The court went on to state, "[W]hile
generally our duty is to give effect to the literal language of a statute,
we are not obligated to do so when reliance on that language would
defeat the purposes of the statute." 79 Therefore, though technically
correct, the taxpayer's interpretation of section 6103(h)(4) was rejected
because of the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of congressional intent

when it enacted the statute in 1976.0

municipal recording office. Therefore, they are already technically public records.
Confidentiality in this case is limited to the concept that the IRS may not freely
divulge this information.
Id. at 754 n.4 (emphasis added).
74. Lampert, 854 F.2d at 337.
75. Id. at 338.
76. Id.; see United Energy Corp. v. United States, 622 F. Supp. 43, 46 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
In United Energy, the taxpayer applied for a temporary restraining order seeking to stop a
Service investigation of the company. Id. at 44. A hearing was held in chambers with no court
reporter present. Id. Following the hearing, the Assistant United States Attorney was quoted
in the Oakland Tribune as saying the company was the subject of an ongoing Service investigation. Id. at 45. The taxpayer sued the government for civil damages under § 7431. Id. at 44.
The issue in United Energy was whether § 6103(h)(4) permitted the Assistant United States
Attorney to repeat to reporters the statements made in the judicial proceeding. Id. at 45. The
court discussed the Tenth Circuit's reasoning in Rodgers v. Hyatt, 697 F.2d 899 (10th Cir.
1983), and concluded that this reasoning was inconsistent with the holding in Rodgers. Id. at
46. The United Energy court cited Posner for the proposition that once certain information is
in the public domain, all privacy in such information is lost. Id. Finally, the court stated: "Once
[United Energy Corporation] decided to make certain of its return information public by filing
a complaint, it lost any entitlement to privacy in that information." Id. Consider the chilling
effect on taxpayer-initiated actions under this reasoning.
77. Lampert, 854 F.2d at 338.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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The Disclosure Cases

a. Rodgers v. Hyatt8l

In Rodgers, the Criminal Investigation Division was investigating
a taxpayer for allegedly underreporting income. 2 At a summons enforcement hearing, the taxpayer's counsel elicited testimony from a
Service investigator.3 The investigator testified that the Service questioned the correctness of the taxpayer's returns when the Service
received information that the taxpayer was dealing in stolen oil and
not reporting the income received from the sale of that oil.- The
taxpayer filed a disclosure suit when the allegations and rumors of
the dealings in stolen oil were disclosed at the summons enforcement
hearing.- The district court awarded the taxpayer $1000 in damages

against Hyatt for unauthorized disclosure of tax return information.On appeal, Hyatt 7 contended that the prior in-court exposure of
the return information removed the protections of section 6103. The
court set out substantial portions of Hyatt's brief and noted the argument that there is no reasonable expectation of confidentiality in matters already of public record. 89 However, the court held that the loss
of confidentiality issue need not be reached when the disclosures had
in fact violated section 6103.9
In rejecting Hyatt's contention that the prior proceeding removed
the section 6103 protection, the court concluded that the issue was

81.
82.

697 F.2d 899 (10th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 900.

83.

Id.

84. "Id. The Service obtained the information concerning the alleged activities of Mr. Rodgers
from the Sheriffs Department and FBI. Id.
85.

Id.

86. Id. at 901.
87. This case arose prior to the repeal of § 7217 which held the individual employee liable
for the disclosure of return information. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94455, § 1202(e)(1),
90 Stat. 1687, repealed by Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248,
§ 357(b)(1), 96 Stat. 646. Today § 7431 relieves the individual of civil liability and instead allows
the suit against the United States. I.R.C. § 7431.
88. Rodgers, 697 F.2d at 901.
89. Id. at 902-03.
90. Id. at 904. The disclosure in this case violated § 6103(k)(6). Section 6103(k)(6) provides
in part: "An internal revenue officer or employee may, in connection with his official duties
relating to any audit, collection activity, or civil or criminal tax investigation ... disclose return
information to the extent that such disclosure is necessary in obtaining information ....
I.R.C.
§ 6103(k)(6). The court held that § 6103(k)(6) was violated because the disclosure was not
necessary to obtain information where none was sought at the meeting where the challenged
disclosure occurred. Rodgers, 697 F.2d at 904-06.
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whether there was an unauthorized disclosure of return information
in violation of section 6103. 91 Furthermore, the court found that the
loss of confidentiality resulting from the prior, authorized in-court
exposure "did not justify Hyatt's violation of the requirement that he,
'return
as an officer of the United States, is prohibited from disclosing
92
information' absent express statutory authorization.
b.

Chandlerv. United States9

Chandler also involved the issue of whether a prior in-court exposure of return information renders the protection of section 6103
academic.9 In Chandler,the Service assessed the taxpayers a frivolous
return penalty. 95 The taxpayers filed suit to enjoin the collection of
the penalty, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Immediately
thereafter, the Chandlers sent the full payment of the penalty and
interest, but neglected to furnish their taxpayer identification number
(TIN) with their payment. 97 The Service received and processed the
payment, but because the Service copied the TIN incorrectly, the
Chandler's account was not credited.9 As a result, the Service levied
on Mrs. Chandler's wages.9

91. Rodgers, 697 F.2d at 906.
92. Id. This is not the only court to find that return information used in a previous court
proceeding continues to enjoy protection from future disclosure. See Olsen v. Egger, 594 F.
Supp. 644 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that the Service was not required to disclose taxpayer's
return information even though the terms of divorce judgment required the taxpayer to disclose
his returns).
In Husby v. United States, 672 F. Supp. 442 (N.D. Cal. 1987), the court rejected the
Government's contention that by the filing of a Tax Court petition, the taxpayer lost all "reasonable expectation of privacy" under § 6103 for the return in question. Id. at 444. The court held
further that the Government's interpretation of § 6103 would force the taxpayer to choose
between challenging a deficiency or enjoying the protection of § 6103, but not both. Id. Thus,
if the Government had its way, once a taxpayer filed a petition for redetermination, all return
information for the years at issue could be properly disclosed, notwithstanding § 6103. Id. This
result is clearly inconsistent with the purpbses of § 6103.
93. 687 F. Supp. 1515 (D.Utah 1988), affd, 887 F.2d 1397 (10th Cir. 1989).
94. Id. at 1517.
95. Id. at 1516.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. The Service did later learn of the payment by the taxpayer, and the Service subsequently credited the taxpayer's delinquent account. Id. The Service conceded the levy did
disclose '"return information." Id. at 1516 n.1. However, the Service maintained that the disclosure was due to the taxpayer's failure to remit their TIN with payment. Id. at 1516-17.
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The threshold issue in Chandler was whether the confidentiality
of the return information disclosed by the levy was lost when the
taxpayer filed suit for injunctive relief.10° The court discussed Rodgers'0 ' and found that the decision was not an anomaly.10 2 Further,
the Chandler court cited Olsen v. Egger'03 as precedent for holding
in-court disclosure of return information does not remove the information from the requirements of section 6103."- After examining the
legislative history, as well as the case law interpreting section 6103,
the court held that the prior disclosure of the taxpayer's return information in court was not relevant to the ultimate determination of
whether the Service unlawfully disclosed that information. 105
c. Johnson v. Sawyer'In Johnson I, decided in 1986, a taxpayer was awarded $21,000
in damages for the unauthorized disclosure of his return information
in a press release.10 7 In a later decision,o8 (Johnson II), the court
ordered the Government to pay almost eleven million dollars to the
taxpayer.10 9 Johnson II detailed the factual setting underlying the
unauthorized disclosure suit, and serves as an example of the abuses
that occur from the uncontrolled discretion of the Service to issue
press releases.11 ° Therefore, the facts require some detail.
In the late 1970s, the Service began investigating the returns of
the taxpayer, Mr. Johnson.' Some discrepancies were discovered be2
tween his business expenses and the deductions listed on his return.11
100. Id. at 1517.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 81-92.
102. Chandler, 687 F. Supp. at 1518.
103. 594 F. Supp. 644 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). See supra note 92.
104. Chandler, 687 F. Supp. at 1518-19.
105. Id. at 1520. The court ultimately found the Service negligently disclosed return information and awarded the taxpayers $1000 in damages for the unauthorized disclosure. Id. at 1521.
106. Johnson v. Sawyer, 640 F. Supp. 1126, 1126 (S.D. Tex. 1986) [hereinafter Johnson I].
107. Id. at 1136. This was determined by multiplying the statutory $1000 damages by the
21 media outlets who received the press releases. Id.
108. 760 F. Supp. 1216 (S.D. Tex. 1991) [hereinafter Johnson II].
109. Id. at 1233. The taxpayer was awarded a $10,902,117 judgment against the United
States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Id.
110. Id. at 1218-24. There is alarming documentation of Service personnel's obvious confusion
over the proper procedures to follow in issuing press releases. Id. at 1223-24. The deposition
of a Service Public Affairs Officer states that she was trained to issue releases without verifying
the correctness of the information. Id. at 1224.
111. Id. at 1220.
112. Id. This was because, while his wife meticulously recorded the amount of each expense
Mr. Johnson incurred, she sometimes inaccurately recorded the nature of the expense. As a
result, some personal expenses were in fact deducted. Id.
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The discrepancies found by the Service agents resulted from Mrs.
Johnson's "well-meaning but eccentric procedures" in recordkeeping.113
As the court points out, Mrs. Johnson's recordkeeping methods had
some flaws. Her methods were sometimes in error regarding sources
of the expenses, but the amounts were always accurate." 4 Furthermore, the evidence showed that Mr. Johnson did not know of his
wife's erroneous recordkeeping methods.11 5 This evidence, however,
did not stop the examining agent from instituting a criminal referral
on the Johnsons' returns for the years 1972 through 1975.
Mr. Johnson feared that his wife would be prosecuted for her
recordkeeping methods. To protect his wife, he did not inform the
agents that the discrepancies found were due to her actions.116 The

end result of the investigations was a recommendation that Mr.
Johnson be criminally prosecuted for tax evasion under section 7201.117
After the case was submitted to United States Attorney's Office,
Mrs. Johnson revealed that it was her recordkeeping that led to the
discrepancies.",8 The United States Attorney's Office offered a plea
bargain: Mr. Johnson would plead guilty to one count of tax evasion,
and Mrs. Johnson would not be prosecuted. Otherwise, they would
both be prosecuted."1 The plea bargain was subject to several conditions designed to limit the publicity of the case. 20 In addition to agreeing to a plea of nolo contendere, the United States Attorney's Office

113. Id. at 1221. Mr. Johnson would inform his wife of his business and travel expenses.
Id. at 1219. Mrs. Johnson would then log the expenses into a diary weekly. Id. At the end of
each month Mr. and Mrs. Johnson would transfer these amounts to spreadsheets. Id. Then, at
the end of each year, the Johnsons listed the total amounts on an annual spreadsheet which

they gave to their accountant. Id.
114. Id. at 1220. For example, Mrs. Johnson would sometimes list amounts spent for personal
items as business expenses when she did not know how to break down some of her husband's
business expenses and cash disbursements. Id. Her second flaw was the occasional altering of
a credit card receipt to cover certain cash disbursements that she did not know how to record.
Id. The court illustrated this second flaw by example. If Mr. Johnson spent $50 on a credit

card and $100 cash on a business trip, Mrs. Johnson might alter the credit card receipt and list
it as $150. Id. Finally, Mrs. Johnson often arbitrarily allocated cash disbursements among various
categories of expenses. Id. Again, as the court states: "It is evident, and deserves emphasis,
that at all times Mrs. Johnson's reporting was scrupulously accurate as to amounts expended;

the weakness of her approach was that she did not recognize the importance of attributing
expenses to their proper source." Id.
115.

Id. It is also worth noting that during the course of the investigation, Mr. Johnson

passed two polygraph tests and offered to take more, but the Government declined. Id. at 1221.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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agreed to recommend probation for Mr. Johnson. 121 A further condition
of the plea bargain was that the United States Attorney's Office would
not issue a press release.12
For four days, the parties proceeded in accordance with the agreement. Thereafter, "the dam broke" when the Service issued a news
release to twenty-one media outlets in the Galveston area.' The news
release, itself a violation of the conditions to the plea agreement,
stated that Johnson had plead guilty to federal tax evasion. 124 It made
no reference to the plea agreement and it contained several false
statements.2 4 Further, it gave the erroneous impression that Johnson
had falsified deductions and altered documents. 126 Making matters
worse, two days after the first press release, the Austin office issued
a second press release.127 After a lengthy discussion of the Federal
Tort Claims Act, the Johnson II court held in favor of Johnson and
awarded him $10,902,117.12-

121. Id. The court would not accept the nolo plea, but it did agree to probation. Id. Thus,
Johnson pled guilty to the one count of tax evasion in a courtroom with no outsiders present
and received a probated sentence. Id. at 1221-22. As the court states:
As Johnson entered the weekend . . . he had good reason to believe that he had
handled a difficult situation in the most sensible way possible, and that he had,
though at the cost of pleading guilty to a crime of which he did not feel himself
guilty, protected both his wife and his career.
Id. at 1222.
122. Id. at 1221. There were five conditions placed on the plea agreement:
(1) all papers filed in the case would give plaintiffs name as "Elvis Johnson" rather
than "E.E. 'Johnny' Johnson," by which he is normally known; (2) papers requiring
Johnson's street address would give it as 1100 Milam Street in Houston, which
was the address of his attorney, and no reference to his address at 25 Adler Circle,
Galveston would be made; (3) the Government would seek to have the presentence
investigation completed before the criminal information was filed so that the probation officer's recommendation could be made known to the judge by the time
the information was filed; (4) the information would be filed late on a Friday
afternoon, and the case would be brought before the judge immediately, so that
arraignment and sentencing could be completed that same afternoon; and (5) the
U.S. Attorney's office would publish no press release.
Id. at 1221.
123. Id. at 1222.
124. Id. In addition, the release identified Johnson as an officer of the American National
Insurance Corporation, and used his 25 Adler Circle address instead of the Houston address. Id.
125. Id. For example, the release stated that Johnson pled guilty of evasion for the 1974
and 1975 tax years. Id. Actually, he pled guilty only for the 1975 year. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. This was done "over the strenuous objections of [Johnson's] attorney, who warned
IRS officials that it could only compound their liability." Id.
128. Id. at 1233.
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The Johnson I court held section 6103 had been violated by the
issuance of the press release.,- The court based its holding on a determination that the statute is quite clear that there can be no disclosure, 130 absent express statutory authorization. 131 The court heavily
emphasized the legislative history of section 6103 and relied on portions
of the Senate Report for the proposition that return information should
"not [be] subject to disclosure except in those limited situations delineated in the newly amended section 6103." 132 Thus, the Johnson I
court narrowly construed section 6103 and refused to create any judicial exception to the section's "general ban against disclosure."' 3

d. Thomas v. United States T

In Thomas, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals refused to follow
either the Lampert or Rodgers reasoning,'3 but instead added more
confusion to the interpretation of the scope of section 6103. While not
specifically rejecting the reasoning of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits,
the Thomas court held that information reported in a news release
did not contain "return information" because it had been obtained from
a Tax Court opinion, not from the return itself.136 Thus, the Thomas
court viewed the press release as merely publicizing a judicial opinion. 137 As a result, there could be no violation of section 6103.

129. Johnson I, 640 F. Supp. at 1133. The later opinion states that the court already held
that the news releases violated § 6103. Johnson 11, 760 F. Supp. at 1224 n.9.
130. Johnson I, 640 F. Supp. at 1131 (finding that given the statute's broad definition of
disclosure, the press release did in fact disclose return information); see I.R.C. § 6103(b)(8);
supm note 66.
131. Johnson I, 640 F. Supp. at 1132-33. The court noted that other courts have held that
technical transgressions of § 6103 are not violative of the statute so long as the disclosure does
not violate the purposes of § 6103, and Congress would not have intended it to be illegal. Id.
at 1132 (citing In re Grand Jury Investigation, 688 F.2d 1068, 1071 (6th Cir. 1982); Cooper v.
I.R.S., 450 F. Supp. 752 (D.D.C. 1977)). However, the court did not agree that Congress was
clear in its language. Id.
132. Johnson I, 640 F. Supp. at 1132 (emphasis in original) (quoting SENATE REPORT,
supra note 10, at 3747). The court pointed out that the exception found in § 6103(h)(4) could
not be extended to cases in which the Service discloses the information to the public. Id. at
1132 n.16.
133. Id. at 1133. The court then stated in a footnote its recognition that the strict interpretation of § 6103 may limit the Government's ability to issue press releases in tax evasion cases.
Id. at 1133 n.18. The court went on to state, although the policy may be bad, it was the
responsibility of Congress, not the court, to change this result. Id.
134. 890 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1989).
135. Id. at 20.
136. Id. at 20-21. Despite its holding, the court maintained that § 6103 is a general prohibition
against the disclosure of tax return information. Id. at 21.
137. Id. at 21.
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The Thomas decision disregards the broad scope of section 6103.
The statute has an expansive definition of return information.1
Further, in light of the legislative history supporting an expansive
definition, 139 the holding can only be viewed as nonsense. 140 Even the
Thomas court appears to make excuses for its decision.'4 The opinion
ends with reference to potential taxpayer abuse by the Service through
issuing press releases and states, "even if what the Internal Revenue
Service did here is an abuse of governmental power, it is not the sort
of abuse at which section 7431 was aimed or for which it makes provision."142 For these reasons, Thomas should not have much impact
on courts interpreting the proper scope of section 6103.
C.

Analysis of the Cases

1. Disclosure versus Lost Confidentiality
Although the courts have analyzed the issue, the question of section
6103's intended purpose still remains unclear. The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals has found that section 6103 restricts disclosure of only
confidential return information.143 But is the purpose of the section
that narrow? Or is the section a general prohibition against the disclosure of return information, unless disclosure is specifically authorized?
The Ninth Circuit does not subscribe to the view that section 6103 is
a general prohibition against public disclosure of return information. 1-

138. See I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2); supra note 36 and accompanying text.
139. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 3748.
140. Thomas is clearly inapposite to the legislative history of § 6103. SENATE REPORT,
supra note 10. In fact, "return information" has been broadly interpreted to encompass any
information gathered by the Service concerning a taxpayer's tax liability. See Dowd v. Calabrese,
101 F.R.D. 427, 438 (D.D.C. 1984).
141. Thomas, 890 F.2d at 21. For example, the court seems to question the reality of its
own holding where it states:
We may seem by this ruling to be condoning the "laundering" of confidential
information, or indulging in the fiction... that every item of information contained
in a public document is known to the whole world, so that further dissemination
can do no additional harm to privacy - as if only secrets could be confidences.
Id.
142. Id. at 21-22. The court also voiced its opinion of the Government's use of the press
releases, and said "[t]he IRS's tactic of publicizing Mr. Thomas's defeat in the Tax Court to his
home-town newspaper may be tawdry, mean, or inspired; it may be thought to intimidate
taxpayers or, more plausibly, to warn them off a course of conduct that can only increase their
tax liability." Id. at 21.
143. See Lampert v. United States, 854 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1034 (1989).
144. See Stokwitz v. United States, 831 F.2d 893, 896 (9th Cir. 1987) (§ 6103 does not
create a general prohibition against public disclosure of tax information), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
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Other courts view section 6103 as "a general prohibition against the
14 5
disclosure of tax return information.'
The question arises, which is the better view? The best approach
is probably somewhere between the polar ends of Rodgers and Lampert. However, certain factors favor the protection of the taxpayer's
privacy interests. Potential abuse exists when the Service widely disseminates taxpayer return information in press releases. Further, the
government lacks both concern and protective procedures for tax146
payers.
2. The Misplaced Reliance on Cooper and Posner
The Lampert decision suggests the purpose of section 6103 is to
prohibit only the disclosure of confidential return information. 147 By
relying on the reasoning of Cooper'4 and Posner,49 the court focuses
on the confidentiality of the return information and not its disclosure.
This reliance is misplaced. Cooper and Posner involved third parties
attempting to obtain tax information from the Service under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). 50
In Cooper, the question presented to the court was whether the
act of returning documents already in the public record to the Service
was sufficient to reinstate the confidentiality of the documents.15' The
court analyzed the issue under two criteria: first, how other confidential documents or communications made public are treated; and second,
the effect of policies underlying FOIA 152 regarding disclosure of such

1033 (1988). Compare this interpretation with the statute itself. The only reference to public
disclosure is in § 6103(m)(1), which authorizes the publication to the media of taxpayers', who
cannot be located, entitlement to a tax refund from the government. I.R.C. § 6103(m)(1).
145. See Wiemerslage v. United States, 838 F.2d 899, 902 (7th Cir. 1988) (§ 6103 acts as
a "general prohibition- against the disclosure of tax return information"); Dowd v. Calabrese,
101 F.R.D. 427 (D.D.C. 1984).
146. See supra note 110.
147. Lampert, 854 F.2d at 338. The statute protects returns and return information. I.R.C.
§ 6103(a). Clearly the return information disclosed in the public record remains "return information." Nowhere in the statute does it mention that only "confidential return information" is to
be protected. Therefore, so long as the information remains "return information" it should be
protected by § 6103 and any disclosure of such information should require express statutory
authority.
148. Cooper v. I.R.S., 450 F. Supp. 752 (D.D.C. 1977); see infra text accompanying notes
151-57.
149. United States v. Posner, 594 F. Supp. 930 (S.D. Fla. 1984); see infratext accompanying
notes 160-61,
150. See infra text accompanying notes 151-61.
151. Cooper, 450 F. Supp. at 754.
152. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988)).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1991

19

Florida Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 5 [1991], Art. 5
1060

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

documents. - The real distinction between Cooper and Lampert is
shown by an analysis of FOIA policy considerations.'l
According to the Cooper court, the underlying purpose of the FOIA
is "to facilitate the broadest possible disclosure of information held by
the government.' 155 In contrast, the primary objective of section 6103
is to limit access to tax return information. 156 Limited access is accomplished by making returns confidential and by restricting the government's ability to disclose this information to very limited circumstances. 15 7 Because the FOIA and section 6103 have conflicting
purposes, courts relying on a FOIA case to decide the scope of disclosure under section 6103 have erroneously focused on lost confidentiality.
In much the same fashion as Cooper, Posner involved the Miami
Herald's attempt to gain access to return information admitted into
evidence during the criminal tax evasion trial of a taxpayer's co-defendant.1- The taxpayer wanted to restrict access to only those matters
in the return specifically revealed in the prior trial. 59 The court stated
that because the returns were admitted into evidence in their entirety,°
they could be obtained by the FOIA applicant in their entirety.'1
Citing Cooper, the court held that once return information becomes
6
part of the public domain, any entitlement to privacy is lost.'1

153. Cooper, 450 F. Supp. at 754. In its analysis, the court used the example* of the
attorney-client privilege. Id. The court stated that the attorney-client privilege created confidentiality much like that of § 6103. Id. Because the confidentiality was the same, the factors which
would defeat that confidentiality would also be similar. Id. One must question if this is correct.
The attorney-client privilege exists for communications voluntarily made between attorney and
client to facilitate openness and frankness between the two. On the other hand, return information
is not truly voluntary, and is required to be given under penalty of law. See I.R.C. §§ 6651-6652,
7203; supra note 46 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying notes 45, 47-48.
154. Cooper, 450 F. Supp. at 755. In the court's words:
Although much of the discussion so far has concentrated on various provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code, it must be remembered that plaintiff requested access
to the documents in question pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. The
confidentiality requirements of 26 U.S.C. § 6103 must, therefore, be read in connection with the policies embodied in the FOIA favoring disclosure.
Id.
155. Id.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
157. See id.
158. United States v. Posner, 594 F. Supp. 930, 931-32 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
159. Id. at 936.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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While Cooper and Posner may be the correct result in a FOIA
action for access to return information, they cannot be equated with
the government's issuance of press releases which report information
contained in the public record. The fact situations are distinguishable.
The two situations can only be equated when every member of the
public who obtains such information from these press releases is a
FOIA applicant. Therefore, the Lampert court's reliance on Cooper
and Posner is misplaced in determining the scope of section 6103.
3. The Public Record, Public Knowledge Fiction
Lampert also maintains that because any citizen could obtain from
local court records the very information contained within the press
releases, the press releases create no additional harm to the taxpayer's
privacy interests. 162 Thus, Lampert implies that there is no difference
between a third party requesting return information in the public
record and the Service publicly announcing such information. 163 Such
an argument has obvious weaknesses. There is a significant difference
between an individual searching through court documents out of personal interest, and a disinterested public learning court document information because of active dissemination of that information by the
government. Additionally, simply because documents are available
does not mean that the public will ever know or ever care to know
about the information contained in them.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the weakness of
the argument that no differences exist between the two scenarios. 6
In a recent interpretation of the Privacy Act of 1974, the Supreme
Court noted "the fiction" that matters in the public record are known
to all so that a subsequent disclosure to the press merely repeats
what is already known by the public, and thereby does no further
harm to privacy.165
T

4. A Complementary View of Confidentiality and Disclosure
The Rodgers's court focused on the authorized or unauthorized
nature of the disclosure of return information under section 6103,
162. Lampert, 854 F.2d at 338.
163. Id. The simple magnitude of the disclosure through press releases should by distinction
be enough. The taxpayers in these cases agree that anyone could go to the local office of public
records and obtain any return information existing in the public record. Id. The issue still
remaining is what the government can do with such information under § 6103.
164. See United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press,
489 U.S. 749, 109 S. Ct. 1468, 1480-81 (1989). The case dealt with the interpretation of §
552(b)(7) of the Privacy Act of 1974. Id.
165. Id. at 762-71.
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without regard to confidentiality. In contrast, the Lampert court found
the Rodgers interpretation of section 6103 was too literal. - The Lampert court held that the true intent of Congress was misapplied.167
Lampert finds the proper focus of section 6103 is on the actual confidentiality of the return information. 6- By claiming that Congress was
concerned most with either confidentiality or disclosure, the courts
and commentators disregard the overriding concern of Congress in
enacting the statute - preventing the abuses against taxpayers by
government misuse of their return information. 169 Therefore, confidentiality and restricted disclosure go hand-in-hand. They should not be
construed as competing policies, but instead, they should be seen as
consistent and interrelated tools to prevent governmental abuses. 170
A close look at the language of section 6103 reveals an emphasis
on the disclosure of return information and not the confidentiality of
that information. Most of the statute provides for exceptions to nondisclosure. , The provision that return information shall be confidential
does not suggest that, once the information loses its confidentiality,
it becomes subject to unlimited disclosure by the government. The
two should not be read as mutually exclusive protections. Under the
Lampert reasoning, so long as the information is lawfully placed in
the public record, it may be disclosed by the Service to anyone.,, The
Lampert interpretation suggests that the only limit on disclosure is
that the government must first lawfully place the confidential information into the public record before disclosing the information. This is
usually accomplished by means of judicial proceedings in open court.
But after Lampert, the government can make taxpayer information
part of the public record by simply filing a civil action for an injunction
against the taxpayer. 7 3 However, Congress enacted section 6103 to

166. See Lampert, 854 F.2d at 338; supra text accompanying notes 78-79.
167. See Lampert, 854 F.2d at 338.
168. Id.
169. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 317-18.
170. Because of recent congressional awareness of the abuses of taxpayers, this finding
would not be at all unwarranted. See Taxpayers' Bill of Rights Hearings, supra note 1. The
Taxpayer's Bill of Rights is an illustration of the concern that taxpayers be treated more fairly
by the Service. See id. The legislative history shows that the abuses of taxpayers by the Service
are not only real, but common. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 317-18.
171. See I.R.C. § 6103(e)-(o) (dealing with either disclosure exceptions or disclosure
safeguards).
172. See Lampert, 854 F.2d at 338; supra text accompanying notes 74-76.
173. Another area that has been the subject of governmental abuses is the issuance of
press releases following indictments against taxpayers. See United States v. Kilpatrick, 575 F.
Supp. 325 (D. Colo. 1983); see also Oversight of IRS and Justice Department Prosecution of
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prevent the widespread use of taxpayer information for improper purposes. 174 Furthermore, the possibility of governmental abuse under
Lampert is too great to go unchallenged. Taxpayers are in an uneven
bargaining position with the Service when their entire tax return
becomes subject to public broadcast simply from the filing of a civil
action.15. The Issue of Increased Voluntary Compliance
There can be little doubt that the possibility of a press release is
a substantial bargaining weapon for Service negotiations.176 However,
threatening the taxpayer with such a weapon conflicts with the standard of fairness needed in our system of self-assessment.'7 In addition,

Several Tax Court Cases, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the IRS of the Senate
Comm. on Finance, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 (1986) [hereinafter ProsecutorialMisconduct
Hearings] (statement of Sen. William Armstrong) (noting examples of government misconduct
in tax cases).
174. See Rueckert v. I.R.S., 775 F.2d 208 (7th Cir. 1985). In Rueckert, the Seventh Circuit,
in interpreting the scope of § 6103, stated: "Section 6103 was enacted in response to the use of
In addition to protecting tax returns and
tax return information for political purposes ....
return information from misuse for partisan political purposes, the Act ensures that, 'the public
...

should not have wholesale, unregulated access to tax information....

."'

Id. at 210 (quoting

McSurely v. McAdams, 502 F. Supp. 52, 56 (D.D.C. 1980)). The government maintains it is
necessary to issue press releases announcing its "victories" against taxpayers as an enforcement
policy to deter further noncompliance by taxpayers. However, studies show that the only real
deterrent is the existence of criminal prosecution. See infra text accompanying notes 184-89.
175. This argument is furthered with the issuance of pre-filing notices (PFN) to investors
in tax shelters. The government consistently wins these cases on the argument that the PFN
is the first step in auditing taxpayers. As such, it is an authorized disclosure under § 6103(h)(4).
Mid-South Music Corp. v. United States, 818 F.2d 536, 539 (6th Cir. 1987); First W. Gov't
Sec., Inc. v. United States, 796 F.2d 356, 360 (10th Cir. 1986); Solargistics Corp. & Geodesco
Inc. v. United States, 65 A.F.T.R.2d 90-741, 90-743 (N.D. Ill. 1989), affd, 921 F.2d 729 (7th
Cir. 1991). See also United Energy Corp. v. United States, 622 F. Supp. 43, 46 (N.D. Cal.
1985) (finding that a taxpayer who filed a temporary restraining order "lost any entitlement to
privacy in that [return] information" to which the restraining order related).
176. See Johnson v. Sawyer, 760 F. Supp. 1216, 1221-22 (S.D. Texas 1991); supra notes
119-22 and accompanying text. In Johnson, the taxpayer chose to plead guilty to tax evasion
to protect his wife and to avoid publicity by way of press release. See id.
177. In assessing ways to improve taxpayer compliance, several goals must be furthered:
fairness, voluntariness, efficiency, and privacy. The Taxpayer Compliance Improvement Act of
1982 HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Oversight of the InternalRevenue Service of the Senate
Comm. on Finance,97th Cong., 2d Sess. 358, 359-61 (1982) [hereinafter Taxpayer Compliance
Hearing] (noting statements of Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Donald C. Lubick & Colette
C. Goodman). With respect to the privacy aspect in furthering compliance, Ltubick and Goodman
state, "Any system of compliance also must be designed in a manner that will minimize intrusions
into the affairs of individual taxpayers. A system that is overly intrusive, or that has the
appearance of being overly punitive, will undermine the public's perception of the tax system
and willingness to comply with our tax laws." Id. at 361.
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taxpayers could lose faith in the system of voluntary compliance if the
government abuses their return information. 178 Congress was acutely
aware of this problem. In the Senate Report on the 1976 Tax Reform
Act, the Senate Finance Committee stated:
Questions have been raised and substantial controversy
created as to whether the present extent of actual and potential disclosure of return and return information to other Federal and State agencies for nontax purposes breaches a
reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of the American
citizen with respect to such information. This, in turn, has
raised the question of whether the public's reaction to this
possible abuse of privacy would seriously impair the effectiveness of our country's very successful voluntary assessment system which is the mainstay of the Federal tax system. 179
By this statement, and by defining return information so broadly,'it can be inferred that Congress knew the damaging effects of releasing
information that the taxpayer is under either Service or Justice Department investigation. I:f taxpayers feel they are being subjected to
the government abuse addressed by Congress, then faith in the self-assessment system will be eroded. 181
Despite the damage to the targeted individual from releasing return
information, the Service claims it needs to trumpet its victories in
order to further voluntary compliance. 8 2 This claim arguably may have
some merit in a post-conviction setting. However, it is not clear
whether issuing a press release of a pending civil or criminal case is
a deterrent to noncompliance. After all, the purpose of the judicial or

178. SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 3747. The report also states, "In a more general
sense, questions have been raised with respect to whether tax returns and tax information
should be used for any purposes other than tax administration." Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 3748.
181. See id. at 3747.
182. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE MANUAL, pt. 31, § (31)4(20)0(1) (1989) (stating
that "[b]ecause the Internal Revenue Service achieves the greatest deterrent effect through
news coverage of criminal tax prosecutions, the Attorney General, has approved the issuance,
by the Service, of appropriate press releases," but requiring that "material contained in such
news releases be limited to facts that are a matter of public record"); see also id. pt. 30, §
(30)(11)00-2(1) (1982) (stating that "because tax administration benefits from deterrent publicity,
the Service will assist with the preparation and distribution of news releases to be issued in
the name of U.S. Attorneys").
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administrative proceeding is to determine whether the taxpayer has
in fact been guilty of any wrongdoing. 18 Further, prior to the determination, the Service has no victory to trumpet.
The deterrent effect of releasing information on successful Service
actions is controverted. Civil penalties have never been shown to deter
noncompliance,"" but may even further increase noncompliance. 18
Therefore, the Service's self-proclaimed need to trumpet its victories
in civil actions is unsupported. 186 Even the deterrent effect of criminal

prosecution for noncompliance is unclear. Various studies on compliance have produced conflicting data. 1' Furthermore, studies have
consistently shown that the severity of both civil and criminal penalties
have no real effect on the taxpayer's noncompliance.ls8 The vast studies

183. See David Pryor, Let's Halt IRS Abuse Now; Too Often, the IRS Exhibits a Bully
Mentality, Slapping Honest Citizens with Liens and Levies in Police-StateFashion, READER'S
DIGEST, Oct. 1988, at 146-50; Denise M. Topolnicki, Presumed Guilty by the IRS, MONEY,
Oct. 1990, at 82-92.
184. Steven Klepper & Daniel Nagin, Tax Compliance and the Risks of Detection and
Criminal Prosecution, 23 L. Soc'y REv. 209, 209 (1989).
185. Ann D. Witte & Diane F. Woodbury, The Effect of Tax Laws and Tax Administration
on Tax Compliance: The Case of the U.S. Individual Income Tax, 38 NAT'L TAX J. 1, 8 (1985).
This study measured the effect of various tax enforcement methods including auditing a return,
assessing the civil fraud penalty, and pursuing a criminal conviction. Id.
186. E.g., Lampert v. United States, 854 F.2d 335, 336 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1034 (1989). In Lampert, the Service filed an injunctive order to prevent the taxpayer
from promoting abusive tax shelters. Id. The Service and Justice Department each issued
separate press releases and announced that suit had been filed and the taxpayers were investigated. Id. These press releases cannot be necessary for their deterrent effect, nor can they be
announcing any victory other than the fact that the Service obtained an injunctive order in an
ex parte proceeding. See I.R.C. § 7408.
187. Michael J. Graetz & Louis L. Wilde, The Economics of Tax Compliance: Fact and
Fantasy, 38 NAT'L TAX J. 355 (1989); Klepper & Nagin, supra note 184, at 217-19; Kent W.
Smith & Karyl A. Kinsey, UnderstandingTaxpayer Behavior:A ConceptualFramework with
Implicationsfor Research, 21 L. & Soc'y REv. 639 (1987); Witte & Woodbury, supranote 185,
at 6-9.
188. Klepper & Nagin, supra note 184, at 238-39. The authors point out that because so
few studies have found any deterrent effect related to the severity of sanctions, some commentaters have concluded that the perceived severity has no deterrent effect. Id. at 239. But see
Winslow, Civil Penalties:"They Shoot Dogs, Don't They?", 43 FLA L. REV. 811 (1991) (citing
study in which taxpayers polled agreed that higher penalties prompt greater taxpayer compliance). The author explains that this result may be because any risk of crminal prosecution
may be an absolute deterrent. Id. If it is an absolute deterrent, there would be no increases
in compliance as the penalties increased. Klepper & Nagin, supra note 184, at 238-39. On other
hand, other studies have indicated that the probability of criminal sanctions was not significantly
related to compliance. Witte & Woodbury, supra note 185, at 8.
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on taxpayer compliance have found the only possible deterrent to
noncompliance is fear of detection and criminal prosecution.19
Results of the numerous studies on taxpayer compliance do consistently indicate that Service action can have an effect on compliance.These studies have also revealed that increasing the frequency of
audits, informational reporting, and withholding requirements have
significant effects on closing the "tax gap."' 191 Unfortunately, sufficient
resources are not available to implement these methods to the extent
necessary to cause a significant increase in the percentage of taxpayers
audited. 192 The informational reporting and withholding requirements
make the tax system one of forced compliance, 193 and, may also be
seen as too much of an intrusion on the taxpayer's privacy.,,
Commentators have suggested that the emphasis should turn to
long-range goals - turning away from the economic deterrence theory
and toward a proper standard of acceptable behavior - to encourage
taxpayer compliance. 19 One commentator states deterence is
thwarted by the political, and apparently nonoptimal, constraints on
the audit process and seems further unlikely given the struggle for
over a century to find an aspirational reporting standard. - Therefore,
if taxpayer compliance is to be significantly increased, it likely will
not result from fear of punishment by the Service. 197 Instead, the more

189. See Klepper & Nagin, supra note 184; Witte & Woodbury, supra note 185. Again this
is based on the taxpayers who were subject to audits. Klepper & Nagin, supra note 184, at 3;
Witte & Woodbury, supra note 185, at 211. Increasing the level of audits to the point necessary
to reach the desired level of compliance is administratively impossible. See also Winslow, supra
note 188, at 865-70.
190. Witte & Woodbury, supra note 185, at 9.
191. See Winslow, supra note 188, at 865-70.
192. Id.
193. Id. This certainly runs contrary to the belief that improved compliance should seek
to promote the goals of voluntariness and privacy. See Taxpayer Compliance Hearing, supra
note 177, at 360-61.
194. The role of privacy as a goal in increasing voluntary compliance requires minimal
intrusions into the affairs of individuals. Taxpayer Compliance Hearing, supra note 177, at 361.
If the system is viewed by taxpayers as "overly intrusive, or has the appearance of being overly
punitive, it will undermine the public's perception of the tax system and willingness to comply
with our tax laws." Id.
195. Winslow, supra note 188, at 871-73. Winslow points out that it would be far more
realistic to change our focus from fear of punishment toward attaining a proper aspirational
standard for taxpayer behavior. Id.
196. Id.
197. Increased compliance will come about "not by continuing to browbeat taxpayers, but
by reestablishing respect for the IRS in the manner in which it performs a difficult and unpopular
task." Taxpayers' Bill of'Rights Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 1, at 4 (statement of Sen. Pryor).
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realistic view is to emphasize respect for the rights of taxpayers, so
they in turn will have more respect for the Service. By adopting this
policy, the government may then attain its ultimate goal of increasing
the aspirational reporting standards of taxpayers. 198
IV.

A.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Amendment of the Statute

Congress must ultimately determine the proper level of taxpayer
protection by clarifying the meaning of section 6103.199 The need for
taxpayer protection has to be balanced delicately with the need of the
government to assess and collect revenue in the most efficient manner

possible.
1. No Extra-Judicial Communications Under Section 6103
Congress should specifically amend section 6103 and prohibit any
extra-judicial communication of taxpayer information by the government. Further, Congress should make clear that press releases and

other extra-judicial communications to the general public are not authorized disclosures under the statute. The inconsistent court interpretations of section 6103 mandate congressional action. By further limiting disclosure, Congress also should clarify that the requirements of
confidentiality and limited disclosure are complementary, and not in-

consistent. Such a limitation would not be contrary to recent legislation
which focuses on protecting taxpayers rights. 200 The proper concern

198. See supra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
199. In the words of Senator Levin:
There are few issues more important than guaranteeing the right of citizens to
expect and receive fair treatment from their government, particularly in the area
of tax collection where extraordinary powers have been placed in the hands of the
IRS and where limits on those powers must come from Congressional oversight
and corrective legislation.
Taxpayers'Bill ofRights Hearings, supranote 1, pt. 1, at 16 (statement of Sen. Levin, D-Mich.)
200. E.g., Omnibus Taxpayer Bill of Rights, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3730-52 (1988).
This act was the culmination of over a decade of concern for the protection of taxpayers from
rITrEE REPORT, supra note 10, at
unfair treatment by the Service. See, e.g., JOINT COI
314-15. Prior to enactment, Congress held several hearings in which stories of taxpayer mistreatment and abuses were disclosed. See, e.g., Taxpayers'Bill of Rights Hearings, supranote 1.
On March 2, 1992, the House of Representatives adopted legislation which is aimed at giving
greater rights to taxpayers in dealings with the Service. The legislation, H.R. 4287, abolishes
the Office of the Ombudsman established under the Taxpayer Bill of Rights in 1988. The
Ombudsman would be replaced with a more independent Office of the Taxpayer Advocate
who would answer regularly to Congress. One significant omission from earlier versions of the
Bill is a provision for expanded attorneys' fees. The Bill's sponsor, J.J. Pickle (D-Tex.), had
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now, as it was at the time of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, is that tax
return information should not be misused by the government.-'
Collecting taxes is, of course, critical to the proper functioning of
our government. Therefore, the need to collect taxes in the most
efficient manner possible also is an important goal. As a result, the
propriety of press releases as tax administration tools must be carefully
weighed against the protection of the privacy interest of individual
taxpayers. Since press releases of taxpayer information have a minimal
deterrent effect and carry an incredible potential of abuse, they should
be severely restricted. By restricting the government's discretion to
issue press releases, the taxpayer and the government will be placed
on a more level playing field in the negotiation and settlement of tax
disputes.
2.

No Extra-Judicial Communications in Pretrial Actions

The argument that announcing victories is necessary in criminal
cases because of its deterrent effect may have some merit. 20 2 However,
if press releases are to continue, they must be limited to the post-conviction criminal setting. 3 The government should not be permitted
to issue pre-conviction press releases because resolution is unknown.
Recent congressional action has focused on charges of various abuses
of taxpayers by the Service. 204 To limit these abuses, pretrial press
20 5
releases must be prohibited.

pushed for the allowance of attorneys' fees for taxpayers who represent themselves successfully
in tax disputes. On the Senate side, Senator Pryor (D-Ark.) introduced similar legislation on
February 20, 1992. The legislation, S. 2239, referred to as "The Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2" or
"T2," contains similar measures to that of H.R. 4287 and is aimed at strengthening the rights
of taxpayers won in the 1988 Taxpayer Bill of Rights.
201. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 3746-47; supra notes 22-28 and accompanying
text.
202. See supra text accompanying note 189.
203. The stated policy of the Service is that it will not issue press releases regarding
indictments or other pretrial actions, nor will it participate in press conferences connected with
pretrial actions. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE MANUAL pt. 30, § (30)(11)00-2(2) (1986). However, news releases related to pretrial actions can be released on a case-by-case basis upon
approval of the U.S. Attorney, and Service officials may participate in press conferences at the
invitation of the U.S. Attorney. Id. pt. 9, § 9448.23(1).
204.

See Taxpayers' Bill of Rights Hearings, supra note 1; Prosecutorial Misconduct Hear-

ings, supra note 173.
205. See ProsecutorialMisconduct Hearings, supra note 173, at 4. The hearings contain a
quote from a portion of an editorial which discusses the government's attempt to prevent the
release of a judicial opinion. The judicial opinion criticized the conduct of several Tax Division
attorneys. Id. That editorial states:
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No Extra-Judicial Communications in Civil Cases Only

At a minimum, there should be a different standard between civil
and criminal cases for issuing press releases. The deterrent effect of
announcing civil investigations is minimal when contrasted to the effect
of announcing criminal convictions.2w When weighed against the posjustification for
sibility that taxpayers will be abused, there is little
°7
the Service to issue press releases in civil cases.m
If press releases must remain a weapon in the battle for increased
compliance, there should be a distinction between taxpayer and government-initiated actions. Taxpayers should not be forced to choose
between protecting their property interests or their privacy interests.
If we accept the argument that all information in the public record
loses its confidentiality, then taxpayers will be forced to make such
a choice. For example, if a taxpayer files a Tax Court petition for
redetermination of an asserted deficiency, the taxpayer has made the
returns in question a part of the public record. Under the Lampert
reasoning, the protections of section 6103 are lost forever. This result
occurs solely because the filing of the petition makes the return information part of the public record. 20 Such an interpretation of section
6103 would be absurd.m
B.

The Protective Order Remedy

Filing a protective order immediately upon notification of a court
proceeding by the Service may be necessary for practitioners to protect
their clients.210 In the Tax Court, rule 103 allows the request to be

When the indictment came down in 1982 against Kilpatrick and other defendants,
the Department of Justice issued a four page press release without worrying about
the reputations of the accused before they had their day in court. Now, suddenly,
they are extremely worried about the reputations of their attorneys ... claiming
that they have not had their day in court.
Id.
206. See supra notes 184-89 and accompanying text.
207. The Service's policy in civil matters allows no extra-judicial statement, if 'there is a
reasonable likelihood that such dissemination will interfere with a fair trial. . . ." INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE MANUAL pt. 9, § 9448.3(1) (1977). However, only extra-judicial statements
connected with civil cases for matters not referenced to the public record are prohibited. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE MANUAL pt. 10, § (10)162 (1974).
208. See Lampert v. United States, 854 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1034 (1989); supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
209. See Husby v. United States, 672 F. Supp. 442, 444 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (holding under
facts very similar to those set out above, that this interpretation of § 6103 would be absurd).
210. See Scott M. Fabry, The Unexercised Power of the Tax Court to Seal Business,
Personal, and Other Confidential Information in Civil Tax Litigation, 68 TAXES 811 (Nov.
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filed. 21 1 In the district courts, rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure212 can protect the privacy rights of individuals in spite of
the overbroad interpretation of section 6103.213

It is well-settled that the court has the power to seal records within
its possession.2'1 Section 6103 authorizes the disclosure of return infor-

mation in judicial proceedings; however, it does not override the court's
broad discretionary authority to control its own procedures.215 One

court has held specifically that an individual's tax returns would be

1990); Martin M. Lore & Marvin J. Garbis, Tax Court Can Restrict Disclosure of IRS Material,
70 J. TAX'N 316 (May 1989).
211. TAX. CT. R. 103(a). Rule 103(a) states in pertinent part,
Upon motion by a party or any other affected person, and for good cause shown,
the Court may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or other
person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,
including but not limited to one or more of the following:
(6) That a deposition or other written materials, after being sealed, be opened
only by order of the Court.
(7) That a trade secret or other information not be disclosed or be disclosed
only in a designated way.
TAX CT. R. 103(a)(6)-(7).
212. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). The rule states in relevant part,
Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and for
good cause shown, the court . . . may make any order which justice requires to
protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue
burden or expense, including one or more of the following: . . . (7) that a trade
secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not
be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way; (8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be
opened as directed by the court.
Id.
213. See Fabry, su pra note 210. In addition, Thomas v. United States illustrated the potential use of the protective order remedy. 890 F.2d 18. 20 (7th Cir. 1989). The Thomas court
pointed out that because the taxpayer failed to seek a protective order to prevent the dissemination of the return information on record, he may have been barred from later complaining
about a subsequent news release reporting information obtained from the Tax Court opinion. Id.
214. Willie Nelson Music Co. v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 914, 918 (1985). This comes under
the authority of the courts to restrict discovery and to control the cases before it. Estate of
Yeager v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 180 (1989).
215. Yeager, 92 T.C. at 185. The court also stated that both the Fifth and Ninth Circuits
have held that the Service's authority to disclose under § 6103 does not take precedence over
th- district court's broad power to control its own proceedings. Id. (citing United States v.
Author Servs., Inc., 804 F.2d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1986), opinion amended by 811 F.2d 1264
(9th Cir. 1987)); see United States v. Barrett, 837 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492
U.S. 926 (1989); United States v. Zolin, 809 F.2d 1411, 1417 (9th Cir. 1987), affd in part, rev'd
in part, 491 U.S. 554 (1989).
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filed with the court under seal and not subject to disclosure to216protect

the privacy and confidentiality interest given to tax returns.
With the over 70,000 cases docketed in the Tax Court alone, potential judicial overload clearly exists with the automatic filing of a protective order. 21 7 Nonetheless, the protection exists. When the interests
of the taxpayer outweigh the public's need for access to return information, the protective order should be granted. The uncertainty of
this protection is the courts' inconsistent application of the rules.218
Nonetheless, the order should be sought to adequately preserve the
21 9
taxpayer's privacy rights.
V.

CONCLUSION

Much confusion and uncertainty exists as to the proper scope of
the "tax administration proceeding" exception to section 6103. To resolve the dispute and provide uniform interpretation, Congress should
amend section 6103. Without congressional action, taxpayers may have
protection from government press releases through protective orders.
If the taxpayer meets the proper standards, the court may seal the
record. However, without congressional action, the Service retains
the power to abuse taxpayers through the actual or threatened use
of the press releases.
As a final illustration of the real abuses government press releases
can cause taxpayers, this article ends with a portion of the direct
examination testimony of the taxpayer in Johnson v. Sawyer:2 20
Q: Now, did he ever have occasion to give you a lecture
about what the IRS was trying to accomplish in your case,
sir?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Would you please repeat that to the Judge?
A: Early on after the agent came on the case ... I said to
him . . . "If I have done something wrong, why don't you
216.
217.

Sendi v. Prudential-Bache Securities, 100 F.R.D. 21, 23 (D.D.C. 1983).
See Fabry, supra note 210, at 826; see also I.R.C. § 7512 (listing penalties for frivolous

actions in the Tax Court)..
218. See Fabry, supra note 210, at 826.
219. See Thomas v. United States, 890 F.2d 18, 20 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that because
the taxpayer had not moved for a protective order sealing the tax returns in the record, he
could not complain about the later publication of such information in a press release); see also

Fabry, supra note 210, at 826 (stating that, "By recognizing that its authority to issue a
protective order pursuant to Rule 103(a) even where disclosure is permitted under section 6103,
the Tax Court has taken an important step towards reestablishing the privacy and confidentiality

interests that should be accorded a petitioner's return and return information.").
220.

760 F. Supp. 1216, 1233 (S.D. Tex. 1991).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1991

31

Florida Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 5 [1991], Art. 5
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

at least tell me or our attorneys what it is that I have done
so that we can fix it and get on with - let me get on with
what I am doing?" His reply to me was that the only favorable publicity that the Internal Revenue Service can get is
when they bring a big one down and he said "your name is
a household word to thousands of people" and I said "do you
mean to tell me that you think you can take me to a court
of law and get a conviction on me with what you have from
my records?" He said, "probably not, but I can get your
name in the newspapers and that will have accomplished my
purpose."n'
One can only hope that this agent's attitude was neither the result of
the Service's training, nor is it the prevalent attitude of the Service
concerning taxpayer news releases.2 Maybe this is reason enough for
Congress to act and make sure there are no more Johnson v. Sawyer.

221. Id.
222. Id. The court stated in finding for the taxpayer, "Ifthe IRS continues to allow mishaps
of the type that blighted Johnson's life to occur, we shall be forced to conclude that this agent's
attitude is typical of the spirit in which the IRS publicizes information about tax evaders." Id.
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